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THE SOCIAL RATE OF DISCOUNT
FOR NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE:
ECONOMICS OR ETHICS?*
WILLIAM D. SCHULZE,** DAVID S. BROOKSHIRE** and
TODD SANDLER**
INTRODUCTION
The traditional economic approach for evaluating alternative policies has been use of benefit-cost analysis. However, application of
this tool to broad social questions, such as the choice to store nuclear
wastes, has been unsuccessful because of several philosophical and
ethical problems raised, first, by the need to value risks to human life
and, second, with valuing in present terms events which may occur
thousands of years hence.
Given these problems, this paper is an attempt to look beyond traditional benefit-cost analysis to consider long term nuclear waste
storage from both an ethical and economic perspective. Thus, we develop formal economic models of alternative decision criteria for nuclear waste storage which are based, at least loosely, on alternative
ethical positions. In particular, three ethical positions are developed
for comparison to benefit-cost analysis.
First, the utilitarian ethic is used to explore the notion that the
proper goal for society is to pursue the good of the whole, or the
greatest good for the greatest number. Second, we focus on a simplified libertarian viewpoint where the protection of individual rights is
more important than the good of the whole. These critiera, explored
in section 3, are consistent with the notion of economic efficiency
and are consequentialist in nature-focusing on outcomes of the decision process. Alternatively, the position may be taken that outcomes
do not necessarily matter, but the procedure leading to an outcome
should be fair, just, or have other attributes. As an example of a procedural or process ethic, we consider a democratic ethic in section 3.
We show that decision outcomes for nuclear waste storage may be
economically inefficient for such ethics which effectively ignore economic efficiency in evaluating outcomes. However, this economic
"inefficiency" can be viewed as an additional necessary economic
cost of achieving a "fair" or desirable decision process.
*The research reported here has been supported by a grant from the National Science
Foundation program in ethics and values in science and technology and by the Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory.
**Members of the Faculty, Department of Economics, University of Wyoming.
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The paper is organized as follows: the first section identifies the
economic and ethical issues involved in long term storage or disposal
of nuclear wastes. The second section develops the utilitarian and
libertarian choice criteria. The third section focuses on a broader analysis of how a democratic ethic might affect the choice of storage
strategy. The final section demonstrates the importance of choice of
criteria using the empirical example of the proposed repository in
southeastern New Mexico.
ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
The first problem alluded to in the introduction, that of valuing
human life, has resulted in a number of alternative attempts to quantify risks in what, from the perspective of economics and ethics, are
confused and misleading ways. A prime example of this type of
study is the Inhaber report to the Canadian government wherein the
risks to life of alternative energy technologies are directly compared
Thus, the number of deaths per unit of energy produced are compared for nuclear, coal, solar and other energy sources. From an economic, and for that matter from an ethical perspective as well, this is
not a correct approach and amounts to adding up apples and oranges.
To make this argument clear, consider the comparison between nuclear power plants and solar home heating made by Inhaber.2 He
argues that, in terms of death per unit of energy, nuclear energy is
safer than solar energy. He includes in his calculations, for example,
lives lost in uranium mining and in the manufacture of materials for
solar collectors as well as risks of nuclear accidents and risks undertaken in installing rooftop collectors.
Is it correct from an economic perspective to add up all of these
deaths from whatever source? The answer is no. The uranium miner
is paid higher wages to accept the risky job of underground mining
which eventually is passed through as a higher price for nuclear
power. So, from the standpoint of economic analysis, this risk is
naturally added as an additional cost in the feasibility or benefit-cost
test. Similarly, markets internalize many risks as costs including, from
those noted above, those in uranium mining (excepting perhaps unknown health risks), manufacture of materials for solar collectors,
and risks of installing collectors on roofs. Higher wages are normally
paid for riskier jobs in all such industries3 so the standard benefit1. See H. INHABER, RISK OF ENERGY PRODUCTION (a report to the Atomic Energy Control Board, Ottawa) (1978).
2. Id.
3. See, for example, Thaler & Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the
Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (N. J. Terlecky, ed.
1976).
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cost test already adjusts for these voluntarily accepted risks undertaken by employees in risky jobs. Riskier technologies will cost more
because employees in free labor markets will demand and get higher
wages to accept such risks. However, one of the risks noted above is
not internalized by such markets. In particular, no market pays citizens initially surrounding a proposed nuclear power plant site (or
waste repository site) to accept the risk of a nuclear accident. No
matter how small that risk might be, such a phenomenon is termed
an externality by economists because no markets initially exist to
internalize the burden of such risks in monetary terms. Thus, the
cost of nuclear power as calculated using standard feasibility analysis
does not include the costs of risk to residents initially surrounding a
nuclear power plant or waste repository. Economists argue that this
external social cost should be included for purposes of benefit-cost
analysis. From the perspective of economics, only the external costs
of risk should be considered beyond the traditional benefit-cost test
(which may just be a comparison of costs where the cheapest source
of energy is best). Inhaber 4 makes no distinction between internalized risks which are voluntary and compensated for by higher wages
and external risks which are uncompensated and also involuntary.
From the perspective of the formal field of ethics, this last point,
that some risks are involuntary, is of great importance. Few ethical
systems would view compensated-voluntary risks as "wrong" in the
moral sense. However, uncompensated-involuntary risks may be
viewed under some circumstances as morally wrong. This is especially
true for those ethical systems which focus on protecting individual
rights; locating a nuclear power plant or waste repository next to an
objecting and fearful neighborhood (even if such fears are groundless)
can be viewed as doing harm to individual rights. Alternatively, some
ethical systems look to the good of the whole and might argue that
those in the objecting neighborhood should make a sacrifice in the
national interest. In any case, the difference between compensatedvoluntary risks and uncompensated-involuntary risks has clear significance both from an economic perspective (the latter class of risk constitutes an externality) and from an ethical perspective (the latter
class of risk raises issues of protection of individual rights). Benefitcost analysis often does fail to reflect ethical viewpoints focusing on
individual rights. However, from the perspective of both economics
and philosophy, Inhaber has made a serious error in simply adding all
risks for purposes of social decisionmaking. Different classes of risk
have vastly different implications.
The second problem alluded to in the introduction, valuing future
4. See INHABER, supra note 1.
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damages which may occur from nuclear waste storage, in current dollars, can be best explained by demonstrating how benefit-cost analysis has traditionally considered risk of catastrophe over time in the
case of large hydroelectric projects. As a decision criterion, for a
hydroelectric project to be constructed, benefits including the value
of electricity generated and recreation must exceed all costs which
include cost of construction, costs of operation, and potential expected damages which might occur if the dam were to fail. Given
that in each year over, for example, an expected 100-year lifetime
there is a certain probable or expected damage from failure of the
dam, the cost to be considered in present terms is the amount of
money which must be invested now to cover expected future damages. Thus, if in the fiftieth year of the dam's life probable damages
are $100,000, the cost in year zero to provide that money with a 5
percent interest rate is $8,208.50, since $8,208.50 reinvested continuously for 50 years in a bank with 5 percent compound interest will
grow to $100,000, given that a bank exists which pays a 5 percent
rate of return over that interval.
In reality, all we are requiring is that the dam insure itself against
potential future losses. However, while it is plausible to assume that
banking and insurance institutions will exist to make this discounting
procedure plausible over the life of a dam, such an assumption becomes doubtful for the time period of up to 1 million years of concern for a nuclear waste repository.' Benefit-cost analysis requires
that the cost of the current investment necessary to cover future
potential damages be considered as a part of the decision process on
efficiency grounds.
To make this money actually available to potential future individuals who may be damaged is an ethical consideration between generations which is ignored by benefit-cost analysis. The long time periods
involved in nuclear waste storage thus bring the discounting procedure into serious question on ethical grounds in that the necessary institutional mechanisms may not exist over the required interval to
justify discounting. Thus, if one desires to transfer compensation to future generations and these mechanisms do not exist, a zero rate of discount, as we show below, may be the most tenable assumption for economic analysis depending on the ethical criterion used in the analysis.
ETHICS AND EFFICIENCY-A CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH

This section considers two alternative value systems-the utilitarian
and libertarian ethics-to be contrasted to traditional benefit-cost an5. See III DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS OF A RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD
FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, EPA 520/6-78-005C.
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alysis in analyzing the risks of nuclear waste storage. These two approaches can be summarized in a highly simplified way-unfortunately necessary for economic modeling-as follows:
Utilitarian. A utilitarian ethical system requires "the greatest good
for the greatest number," based on ideas put forward by Jeremy
Bentham, John Mill and others.6 The social objective is to maximize
the sum of the cardinal (measurable) utilities of all individuals in a
society. For an individual to take an ethically "correct" action, all
consequences of that action must be considered. As translated to a
social decision rule, the criterion requires that the government should
act in such a way as to maximize the sum of utility of society as a
whole. Depending on beliefs about the nature of individuals' utility
functions, any distribution of income can be justified, ranging from a
relatively egalitarian to a relatively elitist outcome. Benefit-cost analysis can be regarded as a very special sub-case of the utilitarian ethic
where individuals' utility functions are linear with identical constant
marginal utilities across individuals and where future utilities are
identically discounted. In summary, utilitarianism argues that for a
two person society with individuals A and B, where utility is denoted
U, a function of money income Y, the social objective should be to
maximize UA(YA) + UB(YB). If, for example, both utility functions
are increasing-strictly concave identical functions of income, then
the best distribution of income is one where YA = YB" If one of the
individuals, for example A, is a "utility monster" i.e., obtains enormously greater utility from income than B, then most of society's income should go to A. The former relatively egalitarian viewpoint has
been expressed by Pigou, while Edgeworth maintained the latter
more elitist viewpoint. 7 Finally, in the special case of benefit-cost analysis, it does not matter how income is distributed between individuals, since utility functions are linear with identical marginal utilities
of income.
Libertarian. The libertarian ethic is most familiarly embodied, in
part, in the U.S. Constitution as the viewpoint that individual freedoms prevail except where others may be harmed. This view, which
emphasizes individual rights, has been formalized by Nozick 8 in a
strict libertarian framework where, generally, the good of the whole
is of secondary importance. We are not concerned here with changing
the initial position of individuals in society to some ideal state as is
6. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1948); J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1953).
7. See A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920); and F. EDGEWORTH,
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS
TO THE MORAL SCIENCES (1967).
8. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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the case in the utilitarian ethic, but rather in benefiting all, or at least
in preventing harm to other individuals, even if they are better off.
This ethic has been partly embodied by economists in the condition
of "Pareto superiority," that all persons be made better off by a
change in resource use or at least as well off as before. Note that this
is a more stringent requirement than Pareto Optimality which requires that no person be made better off without making someone
worse off. Any act in a simplified libertarian framework is immoral
or wrong if anyone else is harmed. Any act which improves an individual's or several individuals' well-being and harms no one is moral
or "right."
Thus, a libertarian (or Paretian) ethic does not define a best distribution of income. Rather, the criterion requires that any change
from the existing social order harm no one. If, for example, two individuals A and B initially have incomes Yo and Yo, then we require
for any new distribution of wealth (YA,YB)-for example, more
wealth becomes available-that
UA (YA)

UA (YA)

and

or each individual must be at least as well off as he initially was. Any
redistribution, e.g., from wealthy to poor or vice versa, is specifically
proscribed by this criterion. Thus, this criterion, while seemingly
weak-i.e., it does not call for redistribution-can block any possible
actions if they do as a side effect redistribute income to make anyone
worse off, however slight the effect may be. Often, then, to satisfy a
Libertarian criterion requires that gainers from a particular social
decision must actually compensate losers.
Given this formalization of the Utilitarian and Libertarian positions, we can model the choice to store nuclear wastes using an expected utility framework as follows: we assume that there are only
two generations. Generation one, the current generation, has to decide whether or not to develop nuclear facilities. Utility of generation
one, U, (Y,), depends on generation one's income, Y,, which initially
is Y1 . This income can be augmented by utilizing nuclear power
which adds B dollars in net to income (net benefits to generation one
of nuclear power) but in turn depends on generating nuclear wastes
of w tons. Thus, B is an increasing function of w, B(w). Income to
generation one is then Y + B(w). However, generation one may decide to compensate the future generation, generation two, for the
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hazards of nuclear waste storage imposed on them. Thus, generation
one might reduce their income by C dollars to be invested for the
benefit of generation two, leaving a net income of Y, = Y + B(w) C. Generation two, with an initial income of Y2 may then receive an
income of Y2 = Y2 + (l+r)C if generation one invests C dollars at a
rate of return r for the period of time between the two generations.
If, however, the two generations are separated by 10,000 years, it is
highly doubtful that compensation is possible as the odds are zero
that a financial institution will survive over such a period to accumulate compound interest at rate r. Of course, we still may properly assume that risk of death to individuals in generation two, 1I2 (w), is a
function of the quantity of nuclear wastes created by generation one,
since nuclear wastes will still be radioactive even after 10,000 years
have passed. We assume, to focus only on the intergenerational risk
issue, that risks to generation one are fixed at li. Utilizing the two
ethical criteria presented above, we will now explore under what decision rule nuclear power should be pursued by generation one, thus
transferring nuclear waste to generation two.
We can summarize the notation outlined above as follows:
=
=
=
=

probability of death in generation i
utility in generation i where U' > 0; U' < 0
income in generation i
net benefits (additional income) of having nuclear power, an
increasing function of the quantity of nuclear waste (w)
r = interest rate
C = compensation from generation one to generation two; C 2 0

Hi
Ui
Yi
B(w)

For generation one, expected utility (El) is equal to the probability of death times the utility obtained from initial income (Y1 ) plus
the benefits associated with nuclear power, minus compensation paid
(if any) the future generation:
El

=

(1-IHI)U, (Y, + B(w)-C)

(1)

The second generation's expected utility is dependent upon the
probability of death as a function of the amount of nuclear waste
times the utility from initial income (Y2) plus compensation paid (if
any) compounded at the rate of interest, r:
E 2 = (1-fl 2 (w))U 2 (Y2 + (l+r)- C)

(2)

The Utilitarian criterion states that the sum of the total expected
utilities of both generations, T, should be maximized;
Max T=E +E 2
w, C

(3)
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where the choice variables are the levels of compensation (C) and
generation of nuclear waste (w). We make the following assumptions
of symmetry between generations: (1) U, (Y)-U 2 (Y) or both generations have the same utility functions; (2) Y1 = Y2 or both generations
have the same initial income; and (3) HIi = I1' or both generations
have the same initial risk. Thus, we explore an egalitarian formulation
of the Utilitarian ethic.
The first order conditions are:

aT/aC = -(I-I°)U,

+ (1-r 2 )U2 (1+r)
aT/aw = (11 0 )U, B' - I12 U2 < 0

0

(4)
(5)

The decision of whether or not to build nuclear power plans thus
generating nuclear wastes can be analyzed in two contexts. The first
situation is that where compensation between generations is impossible or undesirable (C = 0) so (4) holds with inequality; the second is
where compensation is possible and desirable (C > 0) so (4) holds
with equality. We will evaluate whether or not nuclear facilities
should be built, generating waste, by evaluating equation (5) at the
point where w = 0. Rearranging (5) implies that for w > 0 it must be
true that:
B'(0) > (l-IU)O(6)

(1-Hi-)U'

Let us consider the case where compensation between generation
one and two is impossible. Utilizing the assumptions of symmetry between generations, the assumption of no compensation and w = 0
implies that utility in each generation is the same, or U2 (Y2) = U (Y1 ).
This implies the marginal utility of generation one (U;) is equal to
marginal utility of generation two (U2). Additionally, evaluating the
decision at w = 0 implies the same risk levels or Hl = 112 (0). Thus (6)
can be rewritten by substituting U2 for Ui and HI' (0) for I yielding:

B'(0) >

1

(1-H2(0))U 2

(7)

Equation (7) states that generation one can evaluate whether or not
to build a nuclear facility by determining whether the marginal benefits of nuclear power are greater than, less than, or equal to the incremental risk (HI2) times the marginal compensation for increased risk
Us fr generation two which,
orvale
eatvalue of
osaety(1--I
2(0))
of deathof or
safety
U 2 - U for eeaintowih
given our assumptions, is the same as the marginal value of safety for
generation one. Assuming that compensation is impossible results in
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no discounting of future damages (the cost of risk to generation two).
Thus, in order to pursue nuclear power (so optimally w > 0) the marginal benefits to generation one must be greater than the associated
incremental risk to generation two times the marginal value of safety
of generation two both evaluated at w = 0. The discount rate where
no compensation is possible under an egalitarian specification of the
Utilitarian ethic is thus equal to zero.
Let us now consider the decision for generation one under the
Utilitarian criterion where compensation is possible and desirable. In
this scenario, condition (4) holds with equality and the assumption
of equal initial income does not hold: U, (Y) * U2 (Y2). Rearranging
condition (4) and solving for Ul yields:
U I1

, (1-H21.iio
)U (I +r)

(8)

Substituting (8) into (6) and cancelling terms in order to derive the
condition necessary to evaluate the decision to build a nuclear facility
when compensation can be paid, yields:
B'(0) >

r

F' UI2 1
r.

(9)

If the marginal benefits of nuclear power are greater than or equal to
the discounted value, [--r ] , of the incremental risk
U (1H2) to genera2

n-2 )U 2

tion two, times the marginal value of safety

for genera-

tion two, then a policy of nuclear power should be pursued under the
Utilitarian criterion. Thus, if compensation is possible under an egalitarian specification of the Utilitarian ethic the discount rate should
be equal to the rate of interest.
A simple Libertarian criterion can be stated as follows: If generation one's well-being is improved by using nuclear power and production of nuclear waste, then generation two must be at least as well
off as before. The expected utilities for generations one and two defined in (1) and (2) can be used to state the Libertarian criterion:
Max (1-II)U(Y, + B(w)- C)
Wc
(a)

subject to

(1-n(w))U2 (Y2 + (1+r)C)>(1-r 2(0))
(b)
(c)

(10)
2 (2)

We maximize the expected utility of generation one (term (a)) sub-
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ject to the condition that the expected utility of generation two
(term (b)) is greater than or equal to the initial utility of generation
two (term (c)) where no nuclear waste is produced. Thus the rights
of generation two are defended by the constraint. The first order
conditions are
aLaC = -(I-I])U' + X(1-H 2)U (I+r) = 0
(11)
L/aw= (1-4')U, B'- XH'U 2 0
where X is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint.

(12)

Again, assuming an egalitarian symmetry between generations, the
condition for evaluating the decision to build a nuclear facility from
the perspective that initially w = 0, is obtained by rearrangement of
(12) which yields
xH U2
(13)
B'(0) > 1-1-)U
(1.fl-)U"
Only one situation relating to compensation is available for analysis in the Libertarian case, due to the structure of the constraint.
That is, if no compensation is possible then the amount of nuclear
waste must be zero or the Libertarian criterion is violated. The term
(b) in equation (10) would be less than term (c), and generation two
would not be at least as well off as before. Thus, the only situation
of interest for the decision to build a nuclear facility is where compensation is possible for generation two due to the existence of nuclear waste. Solving for X in condition (11) assuming compensation is
possible yields:
(1-Ill)U1
=
(1.i)U(l+r)O
(14)
Substituting into (14) yields:
_)

U

l+r (I+IH2 2)U20

(15)

A policy of nuclear power should be pursued under the Libertarian
ethic only when compensation is possible and the marginal benefits
to generation one are greater than the discounted marginal value of
risk to generation two.
We can summarize our results as follows: The Utilitarian ethic in
the case where identical initial incomes and utility functions are assumed would require discounting only if compensation can actually
be paid. Otherwise a zero discount rate is appropriate. The Libertarian case would reject nuclear waste storage outright if compensation
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cannot be paid, but accepts the discounting procedure if compensation between generations is possible. Since it is unreasonable to assume that compensation can be paid to generations 10,000 years or
more in the future for the storing of nuclear waste, this analysis leads
under the assumption of an egalitarian specification of the Utilitarian
ethic to use of a zero discount rate or under the assumption of a Libertarian ethic to the outright rejection of nuclear waste storage.
We now turn to an exploration of a procedural ethic, and conclude
with a case study which employs both zero and positive discount
rates.
A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH: PROCESS OVER EFFICIENCY
The democratic ethic9 is an important criterion regarding the
choice of a nuclear waste repository strategy since past choices (e.g.,
the dropping of waste canisters off the coast of San Francisco) can be
partially understood with this criterion. More importantly, future
choice concerning repositories will probably be decided either by a
referendum (direct democracy) or by legislative decision (representative democracy). In both instances an understanding of the democratic ethic and its process can be instructive in predicting a resolution to the repository problem.
The democratic ethic differs significantly between direct and representative democracies. For direct democracies the underlying ethic
implies equal weights for all voters of the current generation of
voters,' 0 since each voter has one vote. At times this ethic can overlap with the elitist ethic wherein the current generation's welfare is
maximized without consideration of other generations. Moreover, the
direct democracy ethic can partially coincide with the egalitarian
ethic when the current generation is the least well off generation. The
coincidence, however, is never perfect since the democratic ethic
goes beyond these other ethics and includes a process in which the
current generation's preferences become expressed. If preferences are
sufficiently homogeneous, or if the issue is measurably along a single
dimension, the median voter decides the issue's passage owing to a
balance in the number of voters on either side of the median.' ' This,
however, does not endow the median voter with dictatorial powers
insofar as each issue can be decided by a different median voter. The
9. See A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); D. BLACK,
THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958).
10. The current generation of voters may include overlapping generations of people, especially if a generation includes people born within a certain time interval.
11. See DOWNS, supra note 9; BLACK, supra note 9; and D. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE (1979).
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median-voter result implies that each vote receives an equal weight
and that the voter representing the middle or average viewpoint determines the outcome for the current overlapping generation of
people (voters). Although future generations are initially disenfranchised when a democratic decision is reached, these generations can
vote after they are born and reach voting age. Democratic decisions
and plans may therefore be altered when future voters replace previous voters. As such, the question of consistent and coherent
dynamic choice (see discussion below) becomes of interest. The need
to provide future generations with maneuverability is therefore
crucial under the democratic ethic; repository strategies should stress
retrievability and monitoring possibilities under a direct-democracy
ethic so as to preserve democratic choice for future voters.
When preferences are not homogeneous and/or when issues are
multidimensional, Arrow's voting paradox applies:' 2 either a dictator decides the issue or social choice becomes inconsistent (i.e., intransitive). In the first situation one person from the current generation is empowered to make intergenerational decisions, and in the
latter, choice can be manipulated by the person in charge of the
voting agenda. Both situations are dictatorial and elitist in orientation, and neither implies an agreeable ethic.
A representative democracy, whereby voters elect representatives
who in turn vote on issues, implies a different type of ethic, one perhaps less egalitarian and more shortsighted as compared with the
median voter direct-democracy ethic. In representative democracies
politicians are interested in winning and staying in office.' ' In consequence, office holders and seekers weigh the different welfare functions of their constituency and place higher weights on those individuals and groups who can best keep them in power. Both direct and
representative democracies provide each voter with one vote, but
how these votes influence political decision differs in the two systems. Because most office periods are short and because limits may
be placed on the number of reelections possible, office holders are
primarily concerned with the current generation of voters. Under
such an ethic, myopic repository plans, such as dumping waste in
canisters with twenty-year lifetimes off the coast of a major city, can
be easily understood. This ethic differs from direct democracy because an average or middle position of the current generation may
not emerge as decisive, owing to an unequal distribution of political
influence.
12. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1970).
13. DOWNS, supra note 9; MUELLER, supra note 9.
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In summary, democracy implies different ethics under both representative democracy and direct democracy. Representative democracy
is consistent with an unequal weighting of the members of the current generation of voters. In contrast, a direct democracy characterized by the median-voter result will institute the average view of the
current generation of voters. Finally, a direct democracy plagued by
Arrow's paradox provides for the maximization of the utility function of a dictator drawn from the current generation. The remainder
of this section focuses on the median-voter model, since its ethic
appears to be the most benign of the democratic ethics.
Even though a median voter model institutes the average viewpoint of the current voters, democratic decisions will include a concern for future generations through altruism as expressed by the current median voter's welfare function. This function may assume the
following form:
Ui = Ui (Q, Ui+),

(16)

where Ui is the utility of the ith generation's median voter, Ui+ 1 is
the utility function of the voter's descendant(s), and Qi is the quantity of consumption of the median voter. Such a utility function actually includes arguments of all future descendants, since the median
voter's descendant(s) is concerned about his descendant(s) (i.e., Ui+1
= Ui+I (Qi+1 , Ui+ 2 )), and it goes ad infinitum. Hence, direct democracies can demonstrate a concern for the future and its people depending upon the arguments in the utility function.
Median voter, altruism, and direct democracy
To illustrate more clearly the ethics and process of direct democracy, this subsection further relates the median-voter model to the
nuclear waste repository question. Suppose that a current population
is asked to vote on a referendum to determine the length of safe storage required of a repository. The following assumptions are invoked:
each voter has one vote; the length of storage is a continuous choice
variable (i.e., any storage period can be chosen); majority rule prevails; and the storage period is the only dimension of the problem to
be decided by the referendum. These assumptions are sufficient to
insure that the median voter is decisive in determining the storage
period.
The median voter model is depicted in Figure 1 in which the horizontal axis indicates the length of safe storage required of a repository (the choice variable) and the vertical axis represents the number
of voters supporting each storage period. If the normal distribution
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FIGURE 1
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length of safe storage required
by a repository

aa represents the current generation's distribution of preferences regarding the length of storage, the storage period will be r as desired
by the median voter.
What determines the concern that the median voter has for the
future and for future generations? In a recent article Philip Neher assumed that each generation of voters made intertemporal decisions
based upon their remaining expected lifetime and displayed no altruism toward future generations."' In consequence, a population distribution with a younger median voter will opt for longer-range plans
and will be more concerned with the future than would an older population distribution. Neher argued that old median voters will choose
short plans since they are unconcerned about what will happen after
their death. Neher's analysis has ignored a more important offset to
this trend: older median voters will have more direct descendants
than younger median voters and should therefore demonstrate more
altruism toward future generations. Once altruism is allowed (as it
should be), an older population distribution, such as bb in Figure 1,
may have a median voter who prefers longer storage plans (i.e., r') as
compared with a younger median voter distribution. This result arises
whenever the altruistic motive of the median voter outweighs the
14. See Neher, Democratic Exploitation of a Replenishable Resource, 5 J. PUB. ECON.
361 (1976).
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motive of self-interest. With significant bequests commonly willed to
succeeding generations, this offset is not difficult to believe.
In the median-voter model, demographic factors underlying the
distribution of voters are important in describing the probable makeup of the median voter. Age, family size, income level, and wealth
level will probably play a role in predicting the voter's altruism. A
median voter who is old, has a large family, and is well-to-do will
probably be more altruistic and vote for longer term storage periods
than one who does not have these traits.
If a population distribution's median age increases, the probability
that the median voter is older increases as well. Hence, when demographic factors are important in predicting the characteristics of the
median voter and these characteristics are related to altruism, changes
in voting behavior regarding intergenerational decisions may then be
predictable. For example, the postwar baby boom is now increasing
the median age in the U.S. population distribution. As this median
age increases, greater altruism may be shown by the median voter. If
this occurs, outcomes of referendums in the 1990s on nuclear waste
repository may result in lengthier safe storage periods than those of
the 1970s.
Once again the democratic process highlights the importance of
preserving maneuverability by choosing a strategy that permits retrievability and monitoring possibilities, so that future generations
can choose their most desired option. A strategy whereby mined repositories are used and future options are explored, is somewhat in
keeping with the democratic process. No matter what option is considered, the median voter will probably not vote for the million years
of storage required of transuranic waste, since this would require a
degree of altruism seldom observed. The median voter will instead
opt for some intermediate period that demonstrates some altruism
and that forces a future generation to cope with the problem.
Democracy and Incoherent Dynamic Choice
The previous analysis of the median-voter model indicates that as
demographic factors change so may the median voter's choice; periodic referendums concerning nuclear waste repositories may thus be
required. In representative democracies newly elected officials may
similarly choose to reconsider and to change plans made by their
predecessors. If the process of democracy and its implied ethic is to
be more fully explored, the dynamic choice process whereby decisions are reconsidered at different points in time by succeeding generations of voters must be examined. Drawing upon the work of
Peter Hammond, this section investigates the problem of incoherent
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dynamic choice wherein a society seeks its best ranked alternative,
but chooses the worst ranked alternative by the end of the sequence
of votes.' s This phenomenon can occur either because of a change in
tastes or a change in circumstances.
The decision tree in Figure 2 illustrates incoherent dynamic choice
as it applies to nuclear energy. In Figure 2, n, and n2 represent two
points in time where decisions must be made concerning nuclear energy. At n, , the first decision point, society must decide between no
nuclear energy (choice c) and trying nuclear energy and then deciding
later whether to keep it. Consequently, at the second decision point,
n 2 , society must vote either to keep nuclear energy (choice b) in
spite of the health problems or to give up nuclear energy (choice a) if
they have chosen to try it out. At n, society most prefers option a,
then option c, and last option b. When the decision is made at n,,
society chooses to try nuclear energy in order to attain its most desirable choice, option a. However, once decision node n 2 is reached, society may have to choose b over a because the economy has become
reliant upon nuclear energy and no attractive alternative exists. In
such a situation dynamic choice is said to be incoherent since society
has chosen its least desirable choice, option b. An example of incoherent dynamic choice may apply to the 1980 referendum on the
Maine Yankee nuclear plant. In this referendum the people of Maine
voted to keep the nuclear plant even though widespread reservations
were expressed about health hazards resulting from waste and possible accidents. When supporters of Maine Yankee stated their reason
for keeping the plant, they expressed concern about rising energy
prices as no cheaper alternative energy source existed in Maine. The
constituency was locked into nuclear energy, whether they wanted to
be or not.
In order to avoid incoherency as shown in Figure 2's decision tree,
the generation has two possible options: (1) they may make a sophisticated choice based on the whole decision tree and choose option c,
or (2) they may precommit their behavior so as to create a new option whereby they try nuclear energy but provide for a means to
force themselves to give it up.
Since democracy is a procedure wherein voting choice is preserved
for future generations,' 6 neither precommitment nor sophisticated
choice is a legitimate strategy to circumvent incoherent choice. If, for
example, a generation precommits a future generation to an action,
15. See Hammond, Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice, 43 REV. ECON.
STUD. 159 (1976).
16. See DOWNS, supra note 9, at 23-24. Downs states that democracy requires periodic
choice that cannot be altered by the existing government in power.
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FIGURE 2

b

.-C

n,
Decision Tree
a - use nuclear energy until it appears to create significant potential
health problems
b - become a habitual user of nuclear energy in spite of potential
health problems
c - do not use nuclear energy

this future generation has been disenfranchised from voting its own
desired course of action. Sophisticated choice is also undesirable in a
democracy because this action, when enforced, restricts the domain
of choice for future generations. Essentially, one generation removes
the choice from another because the first generation feels they know
what is best for the future generation.
In summary, the procedure may lead to incoherent choice when a
sequence of decisions must be made. Democracy may also lead to inconsistent plans in which one generation alters plans started by another. Nevertheless, if the democratic ethic of one man, one vote and
its processes of recontracting and majority rule are considered to be
fair, these other problems must be accepted; they are part of the cost
of democracy. Finally, we must stress that democracy is not Pareto
efficient; anything short of unanimity voting is not Pareto efficient.
AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: LONG TERM NUCLEAR
WASTE STORAGE
In section 3 the ethical issues surrounding intergenerational discounting were addressed conceptually. This section will discuss a pro-
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posed nuclear waste repository in southeastern New Mexico as an
illustration of the role of discounting. The regional characteristics
surrounding the repository will be described and the geologic events
that potentially could cause a release of nuclear waste will be detailed.
The Thaler and Rosen marginal cost of risk will be employed to calculate health damages associated with a release of nuclear waste from
1
the repository. 7
The study region covers an area approximately 150 kilometers in
radius around the repository site.' 8 Figure 3 presents the boundaries
and population centers for seven designated zones in the study region.
Each zone comprises either a county or aggregation of counties in
New Mexico and Texas.
The study region is projected to have a population of 1,883,600 by
the year 2020. The projection represents an extrapolated growth rate
from current population trends for high and low population scenarios. For the health calculations the population level is presumed to
remain constant over time for the two population scenarios. This
simplifying assumption is reasonable, given that most population predictions anticipate a leveling of population growth by the year 2020.
The major population centers surrounding the repository are Carlsbad, Roswell, Hobbs, Midland and Odessa. Two important physical
characteristics of the region are the Pecos River and Carlsbad Caverns
National Park. If a release from the repository were of a magnitude
large enough to impact the caverns or the river, a major recreational
resource would be lost. No attempt, however, to calculate recreational values and potential losses has been made. We focus only on
health related damages.
The zones surrounding the repository are reasonably homogeneous
in nature. The approximate land area included in the eight zones is
7,778,000 hectares, with the predominant industry being agricultural.' 9 Approximately 75% of the land is in farms where 5% is irrigated farm land.2 0 The population density is approximately 0.24
people per hectare, reflecting the agrarian nature of the region. 2 1
The repository site consitutes a thick bedded salt formation approximately 800 meters from the surface. The attractiveness of this
particular geologic formation for a nuclear waste disposal site lies in
the inherent stability of this type of formation. This does not mean,
17. See Thaler and Rosen, supra note 3.
18. See Logan, et. al., supra note 5, Economic Analysis: Description and Implementation of AMRA W-B Model, for a complete description of this research.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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FIGURE 3
Boundaries and Population Centers for Zones Surrounding the Waste Repository
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however, that the region and thus the repository will not be disrupted
in some manner over a 1,000,000 year time horizon. 2 2
Possible repository disruption can be modeled by utilizing a fault
tree analysis. This involves the identification of probable events in
various combinations that might result in a waste release from the repository either directly to the surface or to the surrounding groundwater. The release events are then related within the fault tree to an
22. Whether this assumption is valid for a one million year time horizon is unknown.
Different assumptions for population levels could have been made but the case study was an
attempt to implement a methodology and not to be exhaustive.
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environmental transport model. Four fault trees representing different environmental media were constructed. The four media are air,
land, surface water, and groundwater. The principle components or
transport mechanisms causing a direct release into some combination
of the four environmental categories are volcanic action, offset faulting, water leaching and meteorite impact. Waste released into the
four media are then dispersed by the appropriate transport mechanism in the environmental models.
The nuclear waste is assumed to be encased in borasilicate glass inside a stainless-steel casing. The geologic events that could cause a release are assumed to occur after the repository has been sealed. The
time horizon is assumed to be a million years. This truncation of the
geologic time horizon represents a simplifying assumption in that
radioactive waste will exist well into tens of millions of years. Fluidity of dry salt beds and the possible occurrence of ice ages are possible geologic events. No attempt, however, was made to be exhaustive in modeling all possible geologic events. The following geologic
risks were considered in calculating damages: (1) volcanic transport;
(2) offset faulting; (3) changing hydrologic conditions; and (4)
meteorite impact. Since the repository is assumed to be sealed, sabotage is not considered. Let us consider these events in detail.
Volcanic transport can occur in three ways. First, magma (lava)
transport involving the actual displacement of repository material
into one of the environmental media could occur. Second, volatile
transport which describes the movement of volcanic gases through
fractures around the repository could result in a release. Finally,
hydrothermal transport represents the combination of groundwater
and magma jointly impacting the repository from below creating a
geyser effect to the surface. These events are considered in an aggregate form. The overall probability of the volcanogenic transport
mechanism used in the analysis was 8.1 x 1012 /year.
Offset faulting involves fractures in the formation of the repository
allowing the transport of waste. A probability of 1.4 x 10' /year representing an offset faulting event severe enough to release waste from
the repository into upper and lower aquifers was employed.
Hydrologic conditions in the repository region do not necessarily
have to remain constant over time. For instance, quantities, velocities
and direction of flow of water could potentially change. If conditions
were to alter substantially, leaking of the repository waste might
occur. This was, however, considered a very low probability event.
The last major event considered is that of a meteorite impact. The
probability of a meteorite impacting the repository region causing a
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release is estimated to be 1 x 10 3 /year. This would result in direct
expulsion of waste from the repository.
In considering the geologic events, it must be realized that releases
occur into four different environmental media-land, surface water,
groundwater and air-via transport models. Environmental transport
models, in conjunction with release events, determine the quantity
and dispersion level of the waste over the above described study region. Given the knowledge of waste mix by nuclide and the nuclide
decay processes, exposure levels for the regional population are calculated. This provides a dose matrix which coupled with health risk
estimates enables the calculation of expected deaths and economic
health damages. 2 3
Two broad classes of health risk from exposure were incorporated
into the analysis: total cancer and genetic effects. For purposes of
estimation, 20.2 deaths per 106 population for a .1 rem continuous
exposure for cancer mortality was used. The genetic risk was assumed
to be 20.0 deaths per 106 population for a .1 rem continuous exposure. 2 4 However, results will be presented representing total damages
by population scenario.
Using the Thaler and Rosen 2 s estimates for the marginal cost of
risk, the undiscounted health damages in dollars are presented in
Table 1. This represents damages for the low and high population
estimates for an increase of risk of 10 - 3 due to genetic and cancer
effects. Due to the relative uncertainty of cancer versus genetic health
risk numbers, they are presented in disaggregated form. Combined
cancer and genetic health damages using the high population estimate
at a zero discount rate is 1.26 billion dollars. The combined high
population scenario estimate of damages for a 21/2 percent discount
rate is 13 thousand dollars.
Thus, damages are negligible for a 21/2 percent discount rate but
significant using a zero percent rate of discount. This example demonstrates in the extreme the ethical nature of the problem of nuclear
waste storage. Traditional benefit-cost analysis would typically use a

23. For a complete discussionof this modeling effort see S. Logan, et al., supra note 5,
Volumes I and 11.
24. See Logan, et al., supra note 5, at 39, Table 5.5;see also Logan, et al., supra note 5,
at 41. Biological effects of ionizing radiations might not be reached until 900 y(ears) after
an increase in the continuous exposure level In this analysis, it is assumed that a serious
genetic effect may be equated to a death for damage evaluation purposes.... If a nonzero
discount rate becomes justified, it may be appropriate to add provisions which account for
deferring of genetic effects.
25. See Thaler and Rosen, supra note 3.
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TABLE 1
UNDISCOUNTED HEALTH DAMAGES ($) BY POPULATION LEVEL
BASED ON $260,000 FOR AN INCREASE OF RISK OF 10-3a
Discount
Rate

0%
22%

High Population
Scenario
Genetic
Effects

Cancer

8.00xl0

1.18x10 9

-

-

Low Population
Scenario
Total
1.26x10'
1.3x10

Genetic
Effects

Cancer

5.00x101

7.65x10 8

-

Total
8.15x10 8
8.2x10 3

aThis information is from supra note 5, page 67, Table 8-4. This includes local effects (total
for all zones) and nonspecific effects. The nonspecific category of damage is loosely associated with exported agricultural products. Damages in this category are limited by available irrigation water and grazing land capacity, and is not affected by population. Nonspecific damages comprise 46 percent of the total for the high population projection and
70 percent of the total for the low population projection.

discount rate higher than 2 percent. However, as we have shown in
section 3, assuming future generations are unlikely to be compensated for risk of nuclear waste storage, rejection of nuclear waste
storage or a zero percent rate of discount may be appropriate from a
consequentialist ethical perspective.

